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Owner-Manager Perceptions of Regulation and Micro-Firm Performance: 
an exploratory view 
Abstract 
Regulation has traditionally been explored in terms of its negative burden on financial 
performance. We posit a true assessment should consider both its burden and value, as well as 
financial and wider performance criteria. This hypothesis is explored in the context of micro-
firms using original survey data from the English Tourism industry, using multivariate 
regression techniques and qualitative comments. Perceived-Burden demonstrates a negative 
association with financial performance, while Perceived-Value demonstrates a positive 
association with goal-satisfaction. Resulting policy recommendations focus on accompanying 
future regulatory changes with appropriate positive information so managers can move beyond 
burden to recognise the inherent value, and suggesting the need for further research in this area. 
 
Keywords: Micro-Firms, Regulation, Performance, Goals. 
JEL codes: L50, L21, L25, L26, L83. 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Business owners/managers make decisions which contribute to their perceived success/failure. 
What counts as success/failure is subjective and depends upon the idiosyncratic business goals 
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of owners and managers, and hence how they evaluate performance. Larger firms traditionally 
(although not exclusively) focus upon financial measures of performance (e.g. profits/share 
price/market share). In contrast, smaller (especially micro-)firms tend to favour more personal 
goal-oriented measures of success, like self-sufficiency/autonomy/sociability (Greenbank, 
2001; Peters and Kallmuenzer, 2018; Peters et al., 2018; Wach et al., 2016). The 
owners/managers of smaller firms will therefore often make different business decisions vis-à-
vis their larger counterparts (Dunkelberg et al., 2013). For example, an owner/manager of a 
Bed and Breakfast (B&B) who aims to spend (more) time with family may prefer to keep their 
business small to avoid taking up too much time, rather than pursue expansion/profits. 
A key determinant of the performance of an enterprise is the extent to which it is impacted by 
government regulation (FSB, 2004; HM Government, 2013). Regulation, often pejoratively 
referred to as ‘red-tape’, is designed to ensure businesses comply with minimal standards to 
meet the wider public interest, yet it is generally perceived by firms as imposing a financial 
cost and an impediment to business success (Atherton et al., 2008; BRTF, 2007). How much 
of an impediment will depend upon both the extent of regulation and how success is measured. 
Yet what is often ignored, is that regulation might also create some positive value/benefit, 
especially in situations where success is not judged monetarily. For example, regulations may 
lead to new business strategies/opportunities (Teeter and Sandberg, 2017), while also acting as 
a barrier to entry thereby protecting incumbent firms (Klapper et al., 2006). Therefore, a true 
assessment of the impact of regulation needs to consider both its cost and its value in relation 
to appropriate measures of business success. 
In micro-firms -herein defined as firms with 0-9 employees (BIS, 2016a; DTI, 2001)- owners 
and managers are often one and the same, which means these owner-managers are uniquely 
positioned for an exploration of such issues as they are situated at the heart of their firms, 
controlling and overseeing virtually all aspects of the business (Edwards et al., 2002; Kelliher 
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and Reinl, 2009). As such, they not only set the goals of the business but are also likely to 
personally deal with regulatory matters (Edwards et al., 2003; Hart et al., 2008). Micro-firms 
are also important constituents in most economies. In the UK they account for 96% of firms, 
33% of private sector employment, and 21% of private sector turnover (BEIS, 2018). Similarly, 
they account for 93% of EU firms (Eurostat, 2018) and 79% of US firms (US Census Bureau, 
2018). 
Much of the existing literature explores regulation by investigating its ‘burden’, which is often 
found to disproportionately affect micro-firms (e.g. HM Government, 2013; Edwards et al., 
2003; OECD, 2001). Such studies generally focus on the financial impact of regulation (e.g. 
Loayza, 2005; Oto-Peralías and Romero-Ávila, 2017; BIS, 2016c; BIS, 2016b; BIS, 2013), 
despite evidence that small and micro-firms favour other measures of success. It is therefore 
not surprising there is some inconsistency in the evidence that the burden of regulation hampers 
micro-firm performance (Vickers et al., 2005; Kitching, 2006). These mixed results point to a 
more complex relationship between regulation and micro-firm performance requiring further 
exploration.  
This study investigates such a relationship by making a three-fold contribution. The first is 
theoretical. Using extant literature as a basis, we adopt an holistic view of the impact of 
regulation by exploring the idea that regulation includes both positive (value, largely 
unexplored) and negative (burden, already explored through various means but to a limited 
extent in micro-firms) aspects, and that these may have differing effects on business 
performance as considered by both financial and broader goal measures. We believe we are the 
first study to allow the impacts to be both positive and negative at the same time. The second 
contribution is empirical, via the exploration of these theoretical positions using owner-
manager perceptions obtained via original survey data on micro-firms in the English tourism 
sector using multivariate techniques. This industry presents a fitting case because it is highly 
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regulated (TRT, 2012) and features a large number of micro-firms (Chen and Elston, 2013). 
Finally, in making these contributions, the paper also advances the relatively overlooked field 
of micro-firms, particularly those with no employees. Such firms have sometimes been 
(fully/partially) excluded in prior academic research or have only been included as part of a 
larger “small-firm” segment, and yet cover a variety of enterprise types including family 
businesses and new/entrepreneurial ventures. In contrast we explore all micro-firms, including 
those with employees. 
The remainder of this paper is set out as follows. Section.2 develops a theoretical background 
by considering how micro-firms are affected by regulation, how their performance is measured, 
and proposes that regulation has both a cost and value. In doing so, it develops three hypotheses 
to be tested. Section.3 presents the chosen case, details the primary survey data, and the 
methodological approaches employed. Section.4 reports the results, including an ordered-
probit model to test financial performance measure and an OLS regression model to test wider 
goal-satisfaction. Finally, Section.5 explores these findings, before Section.6 concludes.  
2. Theoretical Background 
2.1 Micro-Firms and Regulation 
Regulation consists of rules to restrict the decisions that firms/individuals may take in ways 
that are considered beneficial to society. Unwanted behaviour is prohibited/dissuaded, while 
desirable decisions are encouraged/mandated (BRTF, 2007). Regulations vary by jurisdiction, 
but in developed economies they generally cover everything from who can be employed and 
on what terms, to the way buildings are designed/constructed, and even to the way food is 
grown/prepared/sold (Silbey, 2013). 
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Despite their size, micro-firm are usually required to conform with the majority of the 
regulations that apply to larger firms. Such small firms may struggle to cope with requirements 
concerning tax/employment/the environment/etc., (Djankov et al., 2002). Due to their limited 
resources, and associated lack of managerial expertise, micro-firms are often less able to adapt 
to regulatory demands and/or cover regulatory/other costs (Kelliher and Reinl, 2009). These 
challenges are not unique to micro-firms, since larger small-firms are similarly constrained  
(Kotlar and De Massis, 2013; Chrisman et al., 2014; Carney et al., 2015; Zellweger et al., 2013; 
Ibrahim et al., 2015; Deshpandé et al., 2013; Miller et al., 2016).  
Firms’ interactions with regulation begin before the start of a business’ life where it acts as a 
barrier to entry because it requires owner-managers to seek and then apply knowledge in a 
broad variety of areas (Murdock, 2012; BRE, 2010). Indeed, since regulatory requirements are 
constantly evolving, they remain an important issue throughout the life of a business (Kitching 
et al., 2015). One particular impact identified by prior research is the financial burden of 
adhering to  regulations, and associated influence on firms’ behaviour (Bailey and Thomas, 
2017). We posit such effects extend to what micro-firm owner-managers perceive to be 
relevant regulations, given extant literature on limited managerial knowledge and the risks of 
potential under/over-compliance (Betton et al., 2019; Cumming and Zambelli, 2013; Stokols 
et al., 2001). This burden includes both directly attributable cost increases to acquire/install 
required equipment and the wider impacts like time for research/understanding (FSB, 2004; 
Lewis et al., 2015a; Lewis et al., 2015b). These wider impacts can also extend to 
fear/anxiety/misunderstanding based on imperfect regulatory knowledge. 
Regulatory burden is widely considered to have a disproportionate effect on micro-firms 
because the costs/effects do not vary in proportion to firm size (Carter et al., 2009; HM 
Government, 2013; Calcagno and Sobel, 2014; Zorpas et al., 2008; OECD, 2001). Micro-firms 
are hampered by their limited monetary/time resources, along with poor understanding of the 
 8  
 
relevant regulations and a lack of managerial skill (Betton et al., 2019; Carson, 1985; Johnson, 
2002). For example,  higher wage costs following an increase in the minimum-wage for which 
the burden of compliance is at least partially fixed, therefore the overall costs/effects are a 
disproportionately greater percentage of revenue and managerial time for small-firms (OECD, 
2001; Collard and Godwin, 1999). Furthermore, penalties for non-compliance are often not 
scaled for business size making them particularly harsh for micro-firms (TRT, 2012).  
2.2 Regulation in English Tourism 
The specific impact of regulation will partially depend upon the industry/environment being 
considered, and the regulations in force. The English tourism industry is highly regulated, with 
an estimated 21,000+ regulations (TRT, 2012). This is challenging for micro-firms as it 
requires owner-managers to seek/maintain/apply knowledge in a broad variety of areas which 
have clear costs/effects on the regulatory burden. VisitEngland (2012) provide a guidebook 
which identifies major areas of applicable regulation. Of these, three are either highly specific 
to the individual context (e.g. licencing varies depending on the services offered), or consider 
general issues for which micro-firms are likely to seek and use specialist outside support, 
minimising the impact (e.g. business management/tax (King et al., 2014)). This leaves three 
areas where costs/effects are considerable, although we posit that due to sector experiences (see 
below),  fire safety should be split from health and safety and hence consider there to be four 
areas of regulation that are not only potentially burdensome in the tourism sector, but also 
impact micro-firms operating in other sectors as well since they apply to almost all firms that 
have employees/allow public access. We note there were no substantive changes to any of these 
four areas during or shortly before the survey period. 
Employment regulations enforce restrictions such as base pay, the number of workable hours, 
and the need for firms to check potential employees are eligible to work.  
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Anti-discrimination legislation requires firms to make ‘reasonable changes’ to 
procedures/premises to ensure equal service for all, which is difficult not just because of the 
general resource limitation of small firms, but also because the principle-based term 
‘reasonable’ is open to varied interpretation (Gerrard, 2011). 
Health and safety regulation is spread across many legislative Acts (VisitEngland, 2012), so 
there is much confusion and uncertainty as to relevant requirements, hence a trend towards 
over-cautiousness (HSE, 2017; RoSPA, 2017).   
Finally, fire regulations are considered to be particularly troublesome for small English tourism 
operators (TRT, 2012). A change in the law which sought to simplify over 120 Acts of law 
(BRTF, 2007) also shifted responsibility to a principle-based approach. Owner-managers must 
now interpret/apply regulation based on broadly defined requirements, but without training and 
with contradictory guidance (Fire Safety Engineering, 2009).  
Given the breadth of regulation and the informal record-keeping nature of micro-firms, the 
costs/effects of regulation are difficult to measure (Peck et al., 2012; Chittenden et al., 2002). 
Moreover, it can be extremely difficult to identify and monetise cost/effects since it may be 
impossible to identify what opportunities are lost through increased administration (Chittenden 
et al., 2002). We therefore propose a new subjective measure of ‘Perceived-Burden’, which is 
an assessment based on the opinion of the owner-manager who holds a uniquely central role in 
all aspects of their firm.  
2.3 Measuring Micro-Firm Performance 
Performance is a somewhat nebulous concept, difficult to define/measure (Gourvish, 2006). 
Studies (covering all firm sizes) generally favour traditional financial measures of performance 
(e.g. revenue/profit/stock-price), in part because they are easily understood/compared between 
firms (Fajnzylber et al., 2011; Muñoz-Bullón and Sánchez-Bueno, 2011). Such measures 
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presume a profit-making motive (Wiklund and Shepherd, 2003; Murphy et al., 1996; 
Strielkowski, 2012). However, there are two issues with this general approach: first, some 
financial measures are not available to all firms (e.g. share-price); and second, not all firms 
have such a simplistic profit-making motive (Chrisman et al., 2012; Fisher et al., 2014; Angel 
et al., 2018).  
There is growing evidence owner-managers of small-firms “are not motivated by a desire to 
maximise economic gain” (Dewhurst and Horobin, 1998: p.25) (Kammerlander and Ganter, 
2015; Chrisman et al., 2015; Chrisman et al., 2012), and also that micro-firms in particular hold 
the more subjective goals of “meeting and satisfying the objectives of the owner” (O'Dwyer 
and Ryan, 2000: p.347). Micro-firm owner-managers are effectively their own shareholders, 
therefore they operate firms in accordance with their own wishes (not wider stakeholders) 
(Testa et al., 2018; Aronoff and Ward, 2016). Such broad goals will not only be important as 
success measures, but will also inform the intention/direction of the business, and hence 
decision-making (Shinkle, 2012; Williams et al., 1989; Dunkelberg et al., 2013). We therefore 
posit that regulation affects the setting and attainment of wider goals. For example, an owner-
manager wishing to provide employment may focus on expanding the business, but then find 
employment regulation too onerous and hence limit the goal.  
Different performance criteria will be associated with different evaluations of performance 
(Greenbank, 2001; Strielkowski, 2012) and hence the impact of regulation. For example, 
measured purely on profitability/growth, many micro-firms would be judged poorly but may 
score highly for owner-manager satisfaction (Greenbank, 2001). However, no business can 
completely ignore financial performance if it is to survive (Clark, 2009; Evans and Ilbery, 
1992; Sharpley and Vass, 2006; Pearce, 1990). Therefore, a true evaluation of micro-firm 
performance requires both financial and broader goal-based measures.  
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The ‘financial performance’ of micro-firms can be appropriately measured using changes in 
revenue, an easily interpreted financial concept applying to all firms (Che-Ha et al., 2012; 
McElroy et al., 2001; Blackburn and Hart, 2002; Santos and Brito, 2012; Butler et al., 2012; 
Miller et al., 2013).  
By exploring the notion of Perceived-Burden in a traditional financial manner, we aim to 
validate our unique measure of Perceived-Burden, before expanding our analysis (see below), 
thus:  
H1: The Perceived-Burden of regulation will demonstrate a negative 
association with revenue-change. 
Broader goal-based measures of performance are comparatively less well developed, 
particularly when linking performance with business motivations (Jayawarna et al., 2013; 
Wach et al., 2016). However, it is widely accepted businesses are started for a number of 
reasons (Andersson et al., 2002; Greenbank, 2001; Chen and Elston, 2013) and so such goals, 
and more importantly the satisfaction associated with achieving them, can be a measure of firm 
performance. A number of potential goals associated with business creation have previously 
been identified, with a notable inclination away from pure economic motives (Andersson et al., 
2002; Greenbank, 2001; Birley and Westhead, 1994; Carter et al., 2003; Ray and Trupin, 1989; 
Shane et al., 1991). Discounting duplicates/industry specific issues, there is a relatively small 
set of goals generally held by owner-managers of micro-firms. We hypothesize that collectively 
these form a measure of micro-firm performance: goal-satisfaction, hence:  
H2: The Perceived-Burden of regulation will demonstrate a negative 
association with goal-satisfaction. 
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2.4 Regulatory Value 
A focus on the burden of regulation has meant the potential ‘value’ of regulation to firms has 
generally been overlooked. Indeed, where allowance is made of a positive aspect to regulation 
it is via one-dimensional scales of attitude towards regulation, where it is explored as single 
item between two extremes: burden/benefit; fair/unfair (e.g. Mendoza et al., 2016; Lynch-
Wood and Williamson, 2014; Thomas et al., 2016; Pleasance and Balmer, 2013). A more 
appropriate approach is to use two distinct scales in parallel, independently considering the 
burden and value of regulation. This allows owner-managers to express opinions on both the 
negative and positive aspects simultaneously, rather than one at the expense of the other, and 
hence a more nuanced understanding of the role of regulation on business performance. For 
instance, an owner-manager may strongly oppose the financial burden created by a regulatory 
change, while appreciating the benefit it generates to the firm and society.  
While regulation is  created for altruistic purposes, the associated burden generally falls on 
firms, but benefits often lie elsewhere, usually at the societal level (Fooks and Mills, 2017). 
Benefits to firms may include improved growth prospects/enhanced competition, which can be 
difficult to quantify (Djankov et al., 2006; Doran and Ryan, 2012; Liu et al., 2015). Societal 
benefits are easier to identify, especially since the benefits to business are usually tangential, 
rather than offsetting any cost. For instance, an increase in the minimum wage has a 
direct/obvious financial cost increase, while the benefit to the firm could be ‘more 
motivated/happier workers’, which might increase productivity (Arrowsmith et al., 2003; 
Schmitt, 2013).  
This dichotomy, with costs and benefits accruing in different places, likely explains why small-
firm owner-managers have previously struggled to identify regulatory benefits without 
prompting (Edwards et al., 2003), and also tended “towards the negative when spontaneously 
describing regulations” IpsosMORI (2007, p.3). Relevant potential benefits for firms may 
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include: a level playing field across the industry; improved procedures; a stimulus to encourage 
modernisation and innovation (even if only to mitigate the cost of compliance); improved inter-
business and industry networking; new business strategies/opportunities; and even finding 
legitimacy in existing practices (IpsosMORI, 2007; Edwards et al., 2003; Ram et al., 2001; 
Teeter and Sandberg, 2017).  In contrast the wider benefits are easier to identify, including:  
equipment that is safe; fair/safe working conditions; and fire prevention/detection. 
Owner-managers are uniquely positioned to have a holistic view of regulatory benefits, 
including a public perspective (as they are members of the public) and a business perspective. 
Furthermore, the two will be intertwined as the close/personal relationships between owner-
managers and workers might engender a sense of duty, thereby allowing owner-managers to 
see benefits from an employee’s perspective (Hasle et al., 2012). For example, the ‘burden’ of 
maternity leave offset by granting it to a friend (IpsosMORI, 2007). We therefore hypothesize 
owner-managers are capable of finding (Perceived)-value in regulation which affects their 
business decisions (BEIS, 2016; Boustras et al., 2015), and hence goal-based performance:  
H3: The Perceived-Value of regulation will demonstrate a positive association 
with goal-satisfaction. 
Since the identified value of regulation will not diminish the costs of regulation to the firm, we 
posit there would not be a direct link to micro-firm revenue. 
3. Methodology 
3.1 Context, Sampling Frame, and Survey Design 
The focus of our study is the English holiday accommodation industry, a highly regulated 
sector where 70% of businesses are micro-firms, and which contributes 7.1% of GDP, and 
accounts for 9.5% of UK employment (Tourism Alliance, 2016; Tourism Alliance, 2015). The 
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focus is on England, due to regulatory differences between devolved UK regions. Firms within 
the industry may be categorised into two sub-sectors: serviced (i.e. B&Bs) and non-serviced 
(i.e. caravan parks), which indicates the type of accommodation/the services on offer, and 
hence the regulations which may be in place.  
A database of 3,805 potential respondents was developed using publicly available sources 
including relevant trade-associations. Owners were surveyed via post/email, with several 
follow-ups in the six-months following October 2014. There were 706 valid responses, 
representing a respectable 19% response rate given the sampling frame (Saunders et al., 2015). 
The survey was pilot-tested by potential respondents and the main industry associations were 
approached to check the wording/understanding of the questions and to secure endorsements. 
Following feedback, a small number of changes were made and the finalised survey was 
endorsed by The Bed and Breakfast Association, The British Hospitality Association, 
FarmStayUK, and VisitEngland; and these, plus BedPosts, The National Caravan Council, and 
The Tourism Society sent information about the study to their members. Respondents were 
only asked about regulatory areas relevant to their business. For example, only those with two 
or more workers were presented/asked to complete questions on employment regulation.  
3.2 Analytical Approaches and Model Specification 
We deployed several techniques to test the hypotheses in Section.2. We used descriptive 
statistics and bivariate correlations to explore the data (Ward et al., 2002), then an ordered-
probit model (1), to explore the associations between Perceived-Burden and revenue-change 
(H1). We have included Perceived-Value of regulation in this model for completeness on the 
basis that we are splitting the impact of regulation into value and burden, rather than a single 
unified concept. Furthermore, since we have theorised there is no direct link between 
Perceived-Value and financial performance, we want to explore it in this way in order to see if 
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this position is supported. The model includes several controls which have been used in prior 
literature and thus, we have a reasonable expectation for them to demonstrate an association. 
Additionally, we have included a control called “all areas of regulation”, which tests for any 
bias created by the structure of the survey (given that not all respondents answered all areas). 
We have also undertaken significant validation tests on the data and techniques utilised, full 
details of which are available in Appendix.A. Each variable is described in Section 3.3.  
(1) 𝑇ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑒-𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒
=  𝐵0 + 𝐵1 𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑟𝑠 + 𝐵2 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑏𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠
+ 𝐵3 𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑑 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝐵4 𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟
+ 𝐵5 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑠
+ 𝐵6 𝐴𝑙𝑙 𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑑
+ 𝐵7 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑑-𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
+ 𝐵8 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑑-𝐵𝑢𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 +  𝜀𝑖 
To explore H2/H3, a further variation of the model is employed (2). With the goal-satisfaction 
dependent variable being both continuous and scalar, an OLS estimator is utilised. All of our 
analyses are estimated in Stata v13, first by including the controls then the independent 
variables. 
(2) 𝐺𝑜𝑎𝑙-𝑆𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
=  𝐵0 + 𝐵1 𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑟𝑠 + 𝐵2 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑏𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠
+ 𝐵3 𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑑 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝐵4 𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟
+ 𝐵5 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑠
+ 𝐵6 𝐴𝑙𝑙 𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑑
+ 𝐵7 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑑-𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
+ 𝐵8 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑑-𝐵𝑢𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 +  𝜀𝑖 
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In addition, the survey included an unsolicited comments box at the end, in which 197 
comments were made. In lieu of interviews, which were not possible, these comments have 
been analysed using constant-comparison thematic analysis (Krueger and Casey, 2009). The 
comments/emergent themes inform our primary quantitative analysis, particularly regarding 
causation. The emergent themes are presented in Appendix.B with exemplar comments 
integrated into Sections 4/5. 
3.3 Variable Construction 
3.3.1 Dependent-Variables 
Revenue-Change: The change in nominal revenue across the preceding three-years (at the time 
of the survey), taking an overall view for the period. Responses are coded as decreasing (1), 
stable (2), and increasing (3). 
This measure was chosen to heighten the likelihood of gaining responses given our micro-firm 
owner-manager targets, who are generally less trusting about providing financial information 
in surveys or participating at all (Pearce, 1990; Johnson, 2002; Curran, 2000; Thomas et al., 
1998). Using the pilot and unsolicited survey comments, we were able to ensure respondents 
understood our meaning for this measure (i.e. the overall change over the period, rather than, 
for example, marking ‘stable’ for a  profit changing by a similar amount (i.e. 10%) each year 
for the relevant period). This form of self-reported measure is commonly used in similar studies 
of small-firms and Cruz et al. (2012) note the accepted reliability and correlation with 
independently collected data.  
Goal-Satisfaction: The level of satisfaction (1-7 Likert scale, very dissatisfied to very satisfied) 
with each of a set of up to ten potential goals for a business, which respondents claimed to hold, 
averaged into a single construct variable. We developed a list of goals in line with the literature 
cited in Section.2 which was pilot tested. Additionally, we collaborated with the BBA to ensure 
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they approved (as did all other trade-associations). Table.1shows the percentage of respondents 
who reported holding each of the individual goals, along with their mean satisfaction scores. 
Cronbach’s alpha=0.88, which is above the minimum generally accepted value of 0.7 
(DeVellis, 2012), demonstrating convergent validity (which is true for all of our construct 
variables).  
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Table.1: Owner-manager identified goals 
Goal 
% of 
respondents 
reporting they 
hold the goal 
Mean 
Satisfaction+ 
SD 
Being your own boss 55% 6.28 0.78 
Desire to meet new people 29% 6.20 0.73 
To have work satisfaction 44% 5.94 0.95 
To pursue a desired lifestyle or hobby 24% 5.92 0.87 
Giving employment opportunities to 
those who need them 
7% 5.69 1.04 
To be challenged by the problems and 
opportunities of operating a business 
14% 5.67 1.21 
Giving employment opportunities to 
your family 
13% 5.64 1.01 
To have greater flexibility for your 
personal and family life 
38% 5.42 1.35 
Achieving financial security 58% 5.24 1.20 
Having free time for non-business 
activities 
25% 5.15 1.46 
    
Goal-Satisfaction (the overall score)  5.62 1.01 
+ Mean satisfaction among respondents who held the goal 
Note: Scale (1-7) where 1 indicates very dissatisfied and 7 very satisfied. 
3.3.2 Independent-Variables 
Perceived-Value: The level of agreement (1-7 Likert scale, strongly disagree to strongly agree) 
with the following items regarding the positive aspects of up to four areas of regulation:  
• I understand why [each] regulations exist 
• I believe [each] regulations are good for business 
• [Each] regulations are a sensible control on firms 
Note each statement was presented for the four areas of regulation, with the name of the 
regulation in place of [each]. The items are partly based on Edwards et al. (2003) and 
 19  
 
IpsosMORI (2007), from whom we have extrapolated statements based on their results; and 
were developed using Spector’s (1992) guidelines. The construct is the mean score of 
agreement across each survey item for up to four areas of regulation. Perceived-Burden (below) 
is constructed in the same manner. 
The items used to capture the Perceived-Value and Perceived-Burden of regulation (below) 
consider regulation generally, rather than the impact of a specific regulation. This approach 
allows for the inherent variation between firms and offsets both the negative preponderance 
observed in previous studies regarding the burden of regulation and the apparent difficulty that 
firms face when independently identifying the potential positive impacts of regulation 
(Edwards et al., 2003; IpsosMORI, 2007). Furthermore, the items consider both the impact 
within the firm and broader society. 
Perceived-Burden: Based on the level of agreement (1-7 Likert scale, strongly disagree to 
strongly agree) with the following items for each of up to four areas of regulation, related to 
the perceived ‘burden’ that firms may face (otherwise see above): 
• Small businesses, such as my own, should be exempt from the full force of [each] 
regulation 
• The protections afforded by [each] regulations are an unreasonable burden on my firm 
3.3.3 Controls  
Employers: Accounting for the difference between ‘one-man-bands’ (0) and firms with 1-8 
additional employees (1), distinguishing the smallest, least complex firms, from those who are 
larger and thus subject to wider regulation. In the full dataset, the mean number of workers 
(including the owner-manager) is 2.79; and 25.9% of respondents consisted of only the owner-
manager. 
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Years in Business: The number of years that the owner-manager has operated the business. We 
expect mature firms to act differently and react to stimulus, such as regulation, in a different 
manner to younger firms (García-Quevedo et al., 2014). 
Serviced Accommodation: Distinguishes between serviced accommodation (1), and non-
serviced accommodation (0), to identify the service provided, and allow for differences relating 
to the extent/type and enforcement of regulation. 
Gender: Of the person completing the survey, generally also the owner-manager: women (0) 
men (1).  
Accommodation Units: The total number of accommodation units which are available within 
the firm, indicating the relative size of the business. These may be rooms (B&Bs), pitches 
(caravan parks), or lodges/cottages (self-catering accommodation). 
All Areas of Regulation: As the values of Perceived-Value and Perceived-Burden are 
determined by the mean score of up to four areas of regulation, this categorical variable 
distinguishes between respondents who did not answer the questions for all four areas of 
regulation (0) and those who did (1). Forcing respondents to answer all areas would create bias 
(i.e. employment knowledge would be understandably lower in firms without employees), so 
this tests for any bias created by the different number of questions used to form the independent 
variables (Betton et al., 2019; Lavrakas, 2008; Hair et al., 2010).   
4. Results 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table.2 presents the descriptive statistics of the core variables. It is interesting that the mean of 
the Perceived-Value of regulation (5.28) is considerably higher than that of the Perceived-
Burden (3.81), respectively corresponding with “somewhat agree”/“agree”, and “somewhat 
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disagree”/“neither agree nor disagree”. This suggests despite common rhetoric highlighting 
only the burden of regulation, respondents in fact seem to value regulation more than they 
identify it as an actual burden. Furthermore, there is a clear negative correlation between 
Perceived-Value and Perceived-Burden (-0.47), suggesting that as Perceived-Value increases, 
Perceived-Burden decreases, implying value may actually offset burden to some extent. 
Moreover, several unsolicited comments spoke of the ambiguity towards both Perceived-Value 
and Perceived-Burden, such as: “when I started … I had far more free time. I now spend most 
of my days sat here and working [thanks to regulation]. Joy! And there is a lot of satisfaction 
to be had providing holiday makers with lovely accommodation, which I guess is why I am still 
doing it” (respondent-4048). These initial results demonstrate the importance of exploring both 
value and burden when considering regulation and therefore present an area for further study.  
Table.2 also demonstrates a small positive correlation (Cohen, 1988; Kane, 2013) between 
revenue-change and goal-satisfaction,  indicating a (small) link between the objective and 
subjective measures of success. 
Table.2: Descriptive statistics 
 Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  
1. Perceived-Value 5.28 0.81 -          
2. Perceived-
Burden 
3.81 1.15 -0.47* -         
3. Goal-satisfaction 5.62 1.01 0.29* -0.19* -        
4. Revenue-change 2.15 0.71 0.11* -0.17* 0.21* -       
5. Employers 0.74 0.44 0.01 -0.01 -0.11* 0.05 -      
6. Years in business 15.67 11.30 -0.11* 0.13* 0.01 -0.30* 0.01 -     
7. Serviced 0.40 0.49 0.08* 0.01 -0.04 -0.07 -0.10* -0.10* -    
8. Gender 0.39 0.49 -0.12* -0.05 -0.03 0.04 0.22* 0.00 -0.21* -   
9. Accommodation 
units 
18.81 47.15 0.01 -0.03 -0.02 0.04 0.15* 0.17* -0.23* 0.14* -  
10. All areas of 
regulation  
0.29 0.45 0.12* 0.09* -0.02 0.03 0.28* -0.10* 0.23* 0.02 0.09*  
*p<.05             
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4.2 Revenue-Change 
There are small negative correlations between revenue and Perceived-Burden, lending initial 
support for H1, which has been further explored econometrically in Table.3, with marginal-
effects in Table.4. 
Table.3: Ordered-Probit. Dependent variable: 3-Year Revenue-Change 
Independent variables (1) (2) 
Employers 0.113 (0.135) 0.110 (0.135) 
Years in business -0.035*** (0.005) -0.034*** (0.005) 
Serviced -0.074 (0.124) -0.082 (0.125) 
Gender -0.056 (0.114) -0.077 (0.116) 
Accommodation units 0.003** (0.001) 0.003** (0.001) 
All areas of regulation  -0.049 (0.130) -0.055 (0.128) 
Perceived-Value  -0.0004 (0.086) 
Perceived-Burden  -0.155*** (0.055) 
   
Cut 1 -1.481 (0.157) -2.073 (0.608) 
Cut 2 -0.098 (0.147) -0.667 (0.607) 
Log likelihood -452.417 -447.357 
Chi-square 58.72 (6df) 68.89 (8df) 
Pseudo R2 0.058 0.069 
N 466 466 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Note: Robust Standard Error in parentheses.  
Note: dependent variable coded (1) decreasing, (2) stable, (3) increasing. 
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Table.4: Marginal-effects for Three-Year Revenue-Change 
 Pr(Y=1) 
dy/dx 
Pr(Y=2) 
dy/dx 
Pr(Y=3) 
dy/dx 
Employers -0.027 (0.033) -0.014 (0.015) 0.040 (0.048) 
Years in business 0.008***  
(0.001) 
0.005***  
(0.001) 
-0.012***  
(0.002) 
Serviced 0.020 (0.030) 0.011 (0.016) -0.030 (0.045) 
Gender 0.018 (0.028) 0.010 (0.015) -0.028 (0.042) 
Accommodation units -0.001**  
(0.000) 
-0.0004**  
(0.000) 
0.001**  
(0.001) 
All areas of regulation  0.013 (0.031) 0.007 (0.016) -0.020 (0.047) 
Perceived-Value 0.0001 (0.019) 0.0001 (0.011) -0.0002 (0.029) 
Perceived-Burden 0.037***  
(0.013) 
0.021***  
(0.008) 
-0.057***  
(0.021) 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard Error in parentheses. dy/dx is for discrete change 
of dummy variable for all but the accommodation units, and perceptions of value and burden. 
Note: dependent variable coded (1)decreasing, (2)stable, (3)increasing. 
 
In the model, Perceived-Burden demonstrates a negative association. Indeed, every one-unit 
increase in Perceived-Burden is associated with a 5.7% lower chance that 3-year revenue-
change is reported as increasing, lending further support to H1. Furthermore, we can see that 
Perceived-Value has no statistically significant association with revenue-change. This implies 
the benefits of regulation are seemingly not related to financial performance, which is as we 
theorised. Additionally, the model demonstrates a negative association with the number of 
years in business (1.2% less chance that 3-year revenue-change is reported as increasing, for 
each one-unit increase in Perceived-Burden), implying that the firms’ point in the business 
lifecycle matters. There is also a statistically significant, although negligible (0.1% marginal 
effect), association with the number of accommodation units. We also note that Perceived-
Value is not significant in the model, in line with our theoretical development. Finally, we note 
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that the ‘all areas of regulation’ dummy is not significant in this, or indeed, any of the models, 
suggesting they are free of bias created by the structure of survey responses. 
4.3 Goal-Satisfaction 
The mean score for goal-satisfaction is 5.62 (Table.2) suggesting that overall, respondents -in 
broad terms- are generally satisfied with their performance using this wide-ranging measure. 
Furthermore, the small negative correlation with Perceived-Burden, lends support for H2, and 
the small positive correlation between goal-satisfaction and Perceived-Value, lends support for 
H3. This again demonstrates both the imbalance between value and burden, and suggests that 
for goals, Perceived-Value has a stronger relationship than Perceived-Burden. To explore this 
further, Table.5 presents the OLS regression model for goal-satisfaction. 
Table.5: OLS regression. Dependent variable: Goal-Satisfaction 
Independent variables (1) (2) 
Intercept 5.830*** (0.112) 4.052*** (0.539) 
Employers -0.206* (0.105) -0.189* (0.100) 
Years in business 0.0002 (0.004) 0.004 (0.004) 
Serviced 0.013 (0.093) -0.016 (0.089) 
Gender -0.088 (0.097) 0.050 (0.092) 
Accommodation units -0.001 (0.001) -0.001 (0.001) 
All areas of regulation  -0.007 (0.103) -0.072 (0.098) 
Perceived-Value  0.351*** (0.078) 
Perceived-Burden  -0.035 (0.046) 
   
R2 0.015 0.105 
F (6,464) 1.54 (8,462) 5.79 
N 471 471 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Note: Robust Standard Error in parentheses. 
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Here Perceived-Burden has no statistically significant association with goal-satisfaction; thus, 
despite the earlier correlation, H2 is not supported. This suggests regulations are not 
detrimental to goal-satisfaction measures of performance despite anecdotal evidence about the 
damaging effects of red-tape and unsolicited comments, e.g. “[I] reduced my staff due to PAYE 
rules and regulations which meant more time on computer and away from hands on work” 
(respondent-1963).  
The results also show that Perceived-Value has a statistically significant and positive 
association with goal-measured performance, thereby supporting H3. This result, combined 
with the different means for Perceived-Value and Perceived-Burden, imply regulation is valued 
more than being considered as a burden when wider performance measures are adopted.  
While the number of years in business shows no statistically significant relationship in this 
model, the employers dummy demonstrates a negative association, with the smallest firms 
(having no employees) more satisfied. This may be a result of the inherent complexity which 
comes from running a larger firm, along with an increased degree of separation between the 
owner-manager and the business. For example, by hiring a receptionist, the owner-manager of 
a B&B may spend less time with customers hampering satisfaction towards the goal “desire to 
meet new people”.  
5. Wider Discussion  
These results support both of our central conjectures: owner-managers find value and burden 
in regulation; and satisfaction towards goals and financial measures are both insightful and 
complementary regarding the performance of micro-firms. Perhaps the most important result 
is that we have demonstrated the benefit in this holistic approach to measuring the relationship 
between regulation and performance.  
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Our finding that the Perceived-Burden of regulation has a negative association with revenue 
identifies in micro-firms what has been found elsewhere for larger small-firms. We must be 
cautious about assigning causality, given our available data and the nature of micro-firms. For 
instance, we note prior research has found small/family firms ‘blame’ external factors (like 
regulation) for poor performance, thereby suggesting  poor performance drives onerous 
regulatory perceptions (Hienerth and Kessler, 2006; Jayamohan et al., 2017; Gomez-Mejia et 
al., 2001).  However, while this cannot be discounted, by exploring the Perceived-Value and 
Perceived-Burden independently we gain a more nuanced understanding of regulation. This 
holistic view not only divorces performance from a one-dimensional view of regulation, but in 
our case, finds Perceived-Value to have a higher mean than Perceived-Burden. We therefore 
posit that if poor firm performance was driving perceptions of regulation then we would expect 
the Perceived-Value of regulation to be lower than the Perceived-Burden, which is not the case. 
We therefore tentatively suggest our results imply Perceived-Burden influences financial 
performance as per our theoretical development. Indeed, the unsolicited comments relating to 
Perceived-Burden (of which there were more than other themes, likely due to the strong 
negative rhetoric surrounding regulatory issues) lend themselves to support this view. For 
example, respondent-4247 commented: “regulations I know are a must, but it does financially 
cost small businesses”, while respondent-4361 remarked “we are a small business. I would 
never employ a part-timer ever again because of the paperwork involved and the costs”. 
We have found that Perceived-Value has a statistically significant and positive association with 
performance measured in terms of goal-satisfaction. This was in line with our theoretical 
development where we hypothesized the value inherent to regulation would impact firm 
decision-making, and hence their goal-based performance. As with Perceived-Burden we must 
be cautious in considering the direction of causality, given it may be that firm performance 
generates perceptions of regulatory value. However, such reverse causality seems unlikely 
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given our dual-approach to exploring perceptions of regulation, and because our results show 
no association between financial performance and Perceived-Value. Indeed, in this regard the 
unsolicited comments on regulatory value and goals suggest causality in line with our 
theoretical development and nothing contrary. For instance, respondent-6220 commented, on 
the “...challenge [of running a business and dealing with regulation] and to enlighten people 
to the hidden secrets of where we live, is reward in itself”. 
Further credence to our suggested causalities is found by there being no significant relationship 
observed between the Perceived-Burden and goal-satisfaction, which is in line with our 
theoretical background. In this regard the unique central role played by owner-managers in 
micro-firms is again important. Owner-managers are exposed to all relevant regulations, along 
with the potential impacts and perceived burdens, and must also devise ways to comply. In 
contrast, in SMEs/larger-firms, there is likely to be insulation between regulation and the 
ultimate owner. Therefore, the owner-manager of a micro-firm likely develops an instinct for 
burden based upon the aggregation of all possible negative impacts, most notably the financial, 
thereby heightening the perceived overall burden. Similarly, legally compliant owner-
managers may still worry about the potential costs of an employment tribunal simply because 
they have been exposed to 'horror-stories' featured in trade-association publications (Peck et 
al., 2012). We therefore suggest that while it is not possible to assert the concerns over the 
Perceived-Burden of regulation are invalid, our results suggest such concerns may be over-
stated in relation to the wider goal-based performance measures preferred by micro-firms.  
Having identified that burden of regulation may be overstated within other studies, we would 
therefore also suggest the value of it may be understated. This might be because, as previously 
found, owners and managers are much faster to point out the burdens of regulation than identify 
the benefits. Indeed, most unsolicited comments relating to value identified benefits outside of 
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the firm. For example, “I believe that regulations are essential for the safety of the public” 
(respondent-3804). 
In addition to Perceived-Value and Perceived-Burden, our results highlight two further factors 
which demonstrate associations with performance. Firstly, the number of years in business was 
found to have a negative association with financial performance. This may be due to older firms 
being in a later part of their business lifecycle, thus no longer new and expanding. Given some 
of the unsolicited comments regarding Perceived-Burden, it is also likely that more experienced 
owner-managers, who may have been exposed to more regulations, are actively attempting to 
reduce the size of the business to reduce the perceived burden (as some regulations do not 
(fully) apply to smaller firms).  For example: “I know that many small businesses are thinking 
of giving up providing accommodation because … complying with the regulations is becoming 
too onerous” (respondent-4056). Since, the number of years in business has no association with 
goal-satisfaction, despite such comments, again highlights the importance of investigating both 
value and burden, along with how micro-firm owner-managers measure performance, as older 
owner-managers remain as satisfied as their younger counterparts, even in the face of stable or 
decreasing revenue. 
Secondly the employers dummy had a negative association with goal-satisfaction, but no 
relationship with financial performance. This is not entirely unsurprising, as a firm looking to 
enhance profits would only employ workers when it made financial sense, but a firm with more 
employees will be larger and hence more complex. This complexity may be the issue for goal-
satisfaction as there is likely to be increasing separation between the owner-manager and some 
aspects of the business as it grows. Furthermore, employment regulations in our context 
become increasingly complicated over a relatively small threshold of workers, thus increasing 
the organisational complexity in a nonlinear fashion, thereby creating a dynamic shift between 
operating as a ‘one-man-band’ and employing workers. This is in line with comments relating 
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to Perceived-Burden, e.g. “the current situation is that there is so much legislation it is 
impossible to know and comply with all the regulations” (respondent-1570).  
6. Conclusions 
Using newly collected primary data focussed on often overlooked micro-firms in the English 
tourism industry, we identified owner-manager goal-satisfaction to be an appropriate measure 
of business performance. Furthermore, unlike previous studies, we investigated both the 
Perceived-Value and Perceived-Burden of regulation. Despite the negative rhetoric on the 
damaging impact of red-tape on firms, we found the burden of regulation has likely been 
overstated in studies of small-firms. Our results show whilst regulation does demonstrate a 
negative association with revenue-change, it has no association with goal-satisfaction which is 
a more relevant measure of success for micro-firms. This dichotomy between different 
performance measures goes a long way to explaining the inconsistent results of previous studies 
on the impact of regulation which have usually concentrated on financial measures of 
performance and burden. Meanwhile the Perceived-Value of regulation, which has not been 
explored before, is positively associated with the type of performance that matters most to 
micro-firms.  
There is some potential risk of reverse-causality in our exploration, as we are limited by the 
data available. However, the unsolicited comments from our survey suggest the causality is 
that the Perceived-Value and Perceived-Burden affect micro-firm performance but deserves 
further exploration. In this sense we have found regulation to be both good and bad for firm 
performance in contrast to other studies, and would therefore suggest this holistic approach is 
a better way to examine the impact of regulation. Indeed, this suggests that financial success is 
not necessarily desired for its own sake but for how it facilitates the realisation of the wider set 
of goals held by owner-managers.  
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While we have explored the context of English tourism, we believe that through our choice of 
regulations these results are applicable to a broad range of settings. Therefore, future 
researchers could explore these issues further in other industries. 
Given past studies have illustrated that owner-managers cannot identify easily the benefits of 
regulation, our findings suggest it is crucial that any future regulatory changes are accompanied 
by information on the rationale behind the regulation and the positive impacts it might bring. 
To do so will enhance the benefits associated with the regulation and hence perceived 
performance, whilst also helping to move away from viewing regulation merely as an 
unwelcome burden. 
In drawing these conclusions, we recognise our study might be limited by our measure for 
financial success. Future research should seek to repeat our analysis with more refined 
measures and may wish to explore broader related issues. Furthermore, our survey captured 
firm goals at a single point in time, and future studies may wish to examine how they may have 
changed over the course of the business lifecycle or as a result of regulatory (or other) impacts. 
It could be argued that Perceived-Burden’s lack of association with goal-satisfaction is due to 
goals being ‘rewritten’ around regulation. Since we examined a pre-defined list of goals that 
owner-managers held, we suggest such an impact is limited but it would be difficult to quantify 
this without a longitudinal study. In addition, a longitudinal study would also allow researchers 
to explore changing attitudes towards regulations over time, as well as exploring the impact of 
specific regulatory changes alongside insights into causality. Such issues would benefit from 
being explored in interviews with owner-managers, which could also offer further insights into 
the causality between Perceived-Value, Perceived-Burden, and performance.  
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Appendix.A: Validation 
A.1 Definition of Perceived-Knowledge Instrument Variable for IV-Probit Model (as 
used below) 
Construct variable of self-reported knowledge using the statement “How knowledgeable are 
you about [each] regulation” measured on a 1-5 Likert scale (not at all knowledgeable to 
extremely knowledgeable) for each of the (up to) four areas of regulation with the name of the 
regulation in place of [each]. These results were combined to generate a mean which was then 
converted to an overall percentage. Cronbach’s alpha = 0.79. This variable is based upon prior 
literature (Stokols et al., 2001; Eva et al., 2004), which employs similar measures to test self-
assessments of knowledge.  
A.2 Model Validation  
Given the potential for Perceived-Value and Perceived-Burden to both inform performance and 
to be informed by it, there is a risk of simultaneity. To test for this, we employed a two-stage 
least squares estimator (Baum et al., 2002), using owner-manager’ Perceived-Knowledge of 
regulation as an independent instrument for both Perceived-Value and Perceived-Burden; this 
instrument was based on a construct from our survey. This is an appropriate instrument given 
that regulatory knowledge likely affects both Perceived-Value/Perceive-Burden, and it 
positively/negatively correlates with our variables respectively. We use Perceived, rather than 
Actual regulatory knowledge as prior research suggests the two constructs are distinct, with 
Actual-Knowledge found to be relatively poor and Perceived-Knowledge used for managerial 
decisions (Betton et al., 2019). For the IV-probit model of financial performance, the Wald test 
of exogeneity was found to be acceptable in all cases (Newey, 1987; Wooldridge, 2002). 
Similarly, the Durbin-Wu-Hausman tests for the IV-2SLS-OLS models (goal satisfaction) were 
also found to be consistent (Wooldridge, 2010; Baum et al., 2002), and the Cragg-Donald Wald 
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F statistics indicated that the instrument was not weak (Stock and Yogo, 2005). Therefore, with 
no evidence of endogeneity (full details available upon request), we thus proceed with the 
results of the models as set out in Section 3.2.      
In order to curtail the risk of omitted variable bias, we first note that merely adding variables 
is equally likely to bias results (Hosman et al., 2010; Clarke, 2009). Hence, we followed Clarke 
(2005) and Mitra and Washington (2012), in utilising a review of extant literature and our 
theoretical background to ascertain which variables may demonstrate relationships with the 
dependent constructs, and thus included them in our survey. Furthermore, given that fewer 
variables may in fact yield more accurate models (Breiman, 1992; Clarke, 2005), some 
confounders which were found to be non-significant and have little effect (such as a firm’s 
region), were not included in our estimations. We also examined the residuals of the OLS 
model, which were found to be randomly distributed with no major deviation from normality, 
indicating a suitable level of robustness (Pallant, 2011; Tabachnick and Fidell, 2013). 
Additionally, we performed a Ramsey-Reset test on the OLS model and link tests on all models, 
all of which returned non-significant results, further indicating no evidence of omitted variable 
bias (Pevalin and Robson, 2009; Pugliese et al., 2014; Cameron and Trivedi, 2010). 
Finally, we used White’s test for heteroscedasticity and found no evidence that this should be 
a concern (Kaufman, 2013; Greene, 2018). For completeness, we also explored our models 
using robust standard errors and found that any changes to the p value and standard errors were 
very marginal, further confirming that heteroscedasticity is not a concern (William, 2015; 
Berry and Feldman, 1985; Greene, 2018).  Nevertheless, to reduce any such risk, we present 
robust standard errors for the results of the models as set out in Section 3.2 of the paper. 
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A.3 Data Validation 
The items for Perceived-Value and Perceived-Burden were included within a larger set of 
questions in the survey, and were tested using Principle Component Analysis, which 
highlighted our selected constructs as viable (Spector, 1992; Hair et al., 2010). Face validity 
for goal-satisfaction was satisfied through the process of pilot testing the goal items with both 
potential respondents and the supporting trade-associations (Hair, 1998; Hair et al., 2010). 
In collecting all variables from a singular survey source there is a risk of common method bias 
(Podsakoff et al., 2011), which was mitigated by independently sourcing data on a number of 
variables, including from Companies House/firms’ own websites/trade publications, then 
comparing these to the survey responses. This validation was conducted for 14% of 
respondents (the maximum possible) and no evidence of bias or misreporting was found. 
Additionally, the subject of the study, namely the perceptions of the owner-manager within a 
firm, combined with the fact that there is generally only one owner-manager (and on average 
just one employee) in each firm, makes it impossible to survey multiple respondents per firm. 
However, we were able to test the validity of subjective assessment (Rong and Wilkinson, 
2011) through the pilot study, ensuring the understanding of questions matched our 
expectations. Furthermore, the survey was structured to separate key areas and thus reduce the 
risk of respondents linking different concepts. Respondents were also assured of both 
anonymity and confidentiality to elicit truthful responses (Nielsen and Parker, 2012). 
We also tested random sub-samples of the dataset using our models and found no major 
deviations in results. While it was not possible to develop a stratified sample of micro-firms to 
mirror the entire industry, our sample and response rate are similar to others in the 
accommodation industry, such as (BH&HPA, 2011), and thus, we have no reason to believe it 
is not representative of micro-firms in the English accommodation industry. Therefore, external 
validity can be reasonably thought to be satisfied. (Attewell and Monaghan, 2015; Hair et al., 
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2010). Furthermore, by specifically choosing regulations which affect a broad range of firms 
(of all sizes), we believe that our results have a wide applicability to other firms and industries, 
although future research would be needed to test this. 
Since firms with zero employees might indicate a different rationale for running the business 
and hence different perceptions of regulatory value and burden, we explored the models by 
excluding firms with no employees, and also by comparing different numbers of employees.  
We found no significant differences. This indicates the validity of our overall specification and 
in particular, the approach of using the employers dummy as well as the all areas of regulation 
included dummy (given that non-employers are most likely to have skipped the section on the 
survey dealing with employment regulation). 
Finally, for completeness, we explored alternative measurements of our dependent variables, 
such as the Net-Perceived-Value of regulation (i.e. Perceived-Value minus Perceived-Burden) 
and the Regulatory-Perception-Gap (i.e. the absolute score between Perceived-
Value/Perceived-Burden). These variables are closer to existing research, wherein regulatory 
perception is treated as a single scale, thereby losing much of the detail we collected while also 
removing our ability to highlight the cognitive dissonance of holding concurrent yet opposing 
opinions. We therefore found no useful insights from these measures and henceforth focus on 
the variables defined in Section.3.3 of the paper. 
Further detail on our model and data validation methods/results is available on request to the 
authors. 
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Appendix.B: Thematic Review of Unsolicited Comments 
Theme Illustrative comments 
Perceived-
Burden 
 
87 
mentions 
Good practice in my Bed & Breakfast is followed as a matter of routine but a diary RE: hygiene is a 
waste of my time which I deeply resent, cooking only 4 breakfasts max a day! (Respondent 1878, 
Serviced, Perceived-Value=3.89, Perceived-Burden=5.33, Revenue=stable, Profit=decreasing, Goal-
Satisfaction=6.25). 
Regulations have a disproportionate impact on small businesses. Compliance sometimes has a very 
disruptive impact if you do the right thing e.g. maternity leave. We have no specialist resources to 
cover such things and nobody seems to appreciate that running a small business is like living in a 
turret with different types of regulator attacking from all sides (Respondent 53, Serviced, Perceived-
Value=4.78, Perceived-Burden=3.50, Revenue=increasing, Profit=increasing, Goal-
Satisfaction=5.67). 
Feel many regulations designed across the board and do not always 'fit' to small business without 
incurring costs. Reduced my staff due to PAYE rules and regulations which meant more time on 
computer and away from hands on work (Respondent 1963, Serviced, Perceived-Value=4.92, 
Perceived-Burden=4.38, Revenue=stable, Profit=decreasing, Goal-Satisfaction=7.00). 
Regulation I know are a must, but it does financially cost small businesses (Respondent 4247, Serviced, 
Perceived-Value=6.67, Perceived-Burden=3.17, Revenue=decreasing, Profit=decreasing, Goal-
Satisfaction=1). 
We are a small business. I would never employ a part-timer ever again because of the paperwork 
involved and the costs (Respondent 4361, Serviced, Perceived-Value=5.83, Perceived-Burden=2.00, 
Revenue=stable, Profit=stable, Goal-Satisfaction=4.25). 
I know that many small businesses are thinking of giving up providing accommodation because … 
complying with the regulations is becoming too onerous (Respondent 4056, Non-serviced, Perceived-
Value=4.78, Perceived-Burden=4.17, Revenue=stable, Profit=stable, Goal-Satisfaction=3.00). 
The current situation is that there is so much legislation it is impossible to know and comply with all 
the regulations (Respondent 1570, Non-serviced, Perceived-Value=5.42, Perceived-Burden=5.50, 
Revenue=stable, Profit=stable, Goal-Satisfaction=5.17). 
Perceived-
Value 
 
18 
mentions 
I don’t think there are many businesses that don’t accept the need for certain regulations. Compliance 
of regulations is important but they do need to be made far more appropriate to micro-businesses 
(Respondent 2980, Serviced, Perceived-Value=5.42, Perceived-Burden=4.75, Revenue=stable, 
Profit=decreasing, Goal-Satisfaction=6.00). 
I believe that regulations are essential for the safety of the public (Respondent 3804, Serviced, 
Perceived-Value=5.25, Perceived-Burden=2.25, Revenue=increasing, Profit=increasing, Goal-
Satisfaction=7.00). 
I am a very small bed & breakfast & although sensible regulation is very important (Respondent 3463, 
Serviced, Perceived-Value=5.22, Perceived-Burden=4.83, Revenue=stable, Profit=stable, Goal-
Satisfaction=6.75). 
Goals 
 
8 
mentions 
I have enjoyed running my Bed & Breakfast business in the last 20 years (Respondent 1820, Serviced, 
Perceived-Value=5.33, Perceived-Burden=4.50, Revenue=decreasing, Profit=decreasing, Goal-
Satisfaction=6.33). 
My husband who is 84 and myself run it and do not employ any staff. It enables us to stay in our lovely 
home, otherwise we would have to downsize (Respondent 2078, Serviced, Perceived-Value=5.67, 
Perceived-Burden=3.83, Revenue=increasing, Profit=stable, Goal-Satisfaction=6.00). 
When I started 21 years ago I had far more free time. I now spend most of my days sat here and working 
[thanks to regulation]. Joy! And there is a lot of satisfaction to be had providing holiday makers with 
lovely accommodation, which I guess is why I am still doing it (Respondent 4048, Non-serviced, 
Perceived-Value=5.00, Perceived-Burden=5.00, Revenue=decreasing, Profit=decreasing, Goal-
Satisfaction=5.67). 
Challenge [of running a business and dealing with regulation] and to enlighten people to the hidden 
secrets of where we live, is reward in itself (Respondent 6220, Non-serviced, Perceived-Value=5.44, 
Perceived-Burden=5.00, Revenue=stable, Profit=stable, Goal-Satisfaction=6.50). 
Note: respondent ID, serviced/non-serviced, and individual scores (0-7) in parentheses. Only themes relevant 
to this study are included here. The question stem read “is there anything else you would like to tell us about 
any of the issues raised in this survey?” 
 
